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Abstract 
Electricity generators can raise the price of power by withholding their plant 
from the market.  We discuss two ways in which this could have affected 
prices in the England and Wales Pool.  Withholding low-cost capacity which 
should be generating will raise energy prices but make the pattern of 
generation less efficient.  This pattern improved significantly after 
privatisation.   Withholding capacity that was not expected to generate would 
raise the Capacity Payments based on spare capacity.  On a multi-year basis, 
these did not usually exceed “competitive” levels, the cost of keeping stations 
open.   The evidence for large-scale capacity withholding is weak. 
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1. Introduction 
Few people would dispute that when an electricity industry is liberalised, market power can 
be a problem.  Incumbent generators frequently hold a high proportion of capacity, imports 
are restricted by limits on the transmission lines to adjacent markets, demand is inelastic, and 
the product cannot be stored.  The term “withholding” is often used to describe the way in 
which generators could exploit market power.  “Economic withholding” implies that a plant 
would not offer its output as soon as the market price was high enough to cover its costs of 
doing so, but would wait until the price had risen above its costs.  “Physical withholding” 
implies that the plant’s output is not made available to the market at any price.  In both cases, 
the plants that are withheld from the market will generate less, and are likely to make less 
money, but the strategy can increase the company’s profits by raising the price received by its 
other units. 
 The strategy of withholding units from the market is a close fit to the economists’ 
model of Cournot competition, which is the most popular model of market power in 
electricity.  In a Cournot model, firms decide how much output to sell in each time period, 
and prices are set by the intersection of the demand curve with this quantity.  Cournot models 
can make use of the rich cost data that is usually available, and generally produce a unique 
equilibrium.  These attractive features might be offset, however, by the fact that most 
electricity markets are built around auctions in which generators offer prices for tranches of 
output, and the fixed output assumption of the Cournot model seems empirically 
inappropriate. 
It might be possible to rescue the Cournot approach by pointing out that generators 
need not offer all of their capacity to the market in every period. Kreps and Scheinkman 
(1983) have shown that when generators choose capacities and then compete in prices, the 
process can end up with prices at the Cournot level.  If generators can be sure that they will 
collectively offer no more capacity than the market will need, then they can drive up prices 
without fearing that their rivals will have the spare capacity to expand output and steal their 
market share.   
This paper asks whether British generators have been keeping capacity away from the 
market in order to raise prices above competitive levels.  It examines two possible strategies.  
One is to reduce the overall level of capacity available, keeping high-cost plants from the 
market, which will raise the component of the British spot price designed to reward capacity 
when it is scarce.  This strategy was described by the regulator (Offer, 1991) and studied by 
Newbery (1995).  The second strategy is to reduce the overall level of capacity by keeping 
low-cost plants from the market, ensuring that a higher-cost station sets the energy 
component of the spot price, at a higher level than if all the capacity was available.  This 
strategy is discussed by Wolak and Patrick (1997), who support their argument with data 
implying that capacity was being withheld at stations owned by the dominant British 
generators, which had lower availability than comparable US plants.  
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This paper argues that availability figures do not provide conclusive evidence of 
capacity withholding to raise prices.  Capacity could be held back from the market at times 
when there was no likelihood of it being called on to generate, with no impact on prices.  The 
stations would not be commercially available (the definition used in the British electricity 
market) even though, technically, they were not subject to maintenance and could be made 
available (a more traditional definition, and that used in the US).  To look for evidence of 
capacity withholding related to market power, we must examine prices and generation 
patterns. 
The next section of the paper outlines the British electricity market.  The third section 
considers power markets and approaches to modelling them.  Section 4 discusses “simple” 
capacity withholding, aimed to drive up the capacity payment.  Section 5 discusses 
“sophisticated” withholding aimed at the energy price.  A final section offers brief 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. The British Electricity Market 
The electricity industry in England and Wales was restructured in March 1990.  The 
integrated Central Electricity Generating Board was divided into three generating companies 
and the National Grid Company (NGC), responsible for transmission.  NGC also operated the 
daily spot market, the Pool, in which practically all electricity had to be traded.  Every day, 
generators submitted price bids for each of their available units, and NGC calculated the 
least-cost operating schedule for the following day.  The System Marginal Price (SMP) for 
each half-hour was based on the bid of the most expensive unit in normal operation during 
that half-hour.  A second component of the spot price, the capacity payment, was based on 
the balance between available capacity and expected demand.  NGC calculated the loss of 
load probability (with some smoothing) and multiplied it by the value of lost load (set at 
£2/kWh in 1990, and increased annually by the rate of inflation), less SMP, to give the 
capacity payment.  SMP and the capacity payment gave the Pool Purchase Price, paid to all 
generators for their scheduled output.  Generators that were available, but were not 
scheduled, also received a capacity payment, and the cost of this, and various other payments 
related to system support, were recovered through a charge known as Uplift.1  The Pool 
Purchase Price plus Uplift gave the Pool Selling Price, paid by all buyers. 
 The main buyers in the Pool were the twelve Regional Electricity Companies (RECs), 
responsible for distribution, and with an 8-year franchise over supply (retailing) to the 
industry’s smaller consumers.  The largest consumers, however, could choose their supplier 
from the time of the restructuring, and the majority soon did so.  Some bought from other 
RECs, and a few of the largest bought on their own behalf in the Pool, but the most active 
suppliers were the two major generators, National Power and PowerGen.  These companies 
                                                     
1 In 1997, some of the charges recovered through Uplift were transferred to a new charge, the Transmission 
Services Use of System charge.  This is not formally part of the Pool Selling Price, and should be added to it in 
any comparison of selling prices over time, but the distinction is not relevant to this paper. 
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had inherited all the industry’s conventional capacity (29 GW and 20 GW respectively), 
while the nuclear stations were given to Nuclear Electric.  They had proved impossible to 
privatise at the start of the restructuring, although the more modern stations were eventually 
privatised in 1996. 
 In the attempt to privatise the nuclear stations, however, the government had only 
created two large conventional generating companies, and it soon became clear that they had 
substantial market power.  The regulator2 issued a series of reports on their behaviour, 
culminating with a series of Undertakings announced in 1994.  The companies agreed to sell 
6 GW of capacity (about 15% of their total at the time), and to keep Pool prices below 
specified levels in 1994/5 and 1995/6.  All the capacity was sold to the same company 
(Eastern, one of the RECs), and market power soon resurfaced as an issue.  National Power 
and PowerGen agreed to sell more capacity in 1998, in return for permission for vertical 
mergers,3 which had been denied them in 1996.  The companies have since sold more of their 
capacity, on a voluntary basis.  Nevertheless, the regulator tried to impose a “good behaviour 
condition” in the regulatory licences4 of the eight largest generators.  Two of the generators 
resisted, and after the Competition Commission determined that the clause might be expected 
to act against the public interest, it was removed from the licences of those generators that 
had accepted it. Furthermore, the Pool was abolished and replaced by New Electricity 
Trading Arrangements in March 2001, which the regulator and the government believed 
would be less susceptible to market power.5   
 Divestitures by the incumbents were not the only way in which they lost market share 
over the 1990s.  Most of the RECs, and many later entrants, invested in new Combined Cycle 
Gas Turbine stations, which have now taken nearly 20% of the market.  The earlier stations 
were all supported by long-term contracts, which hedged the Pool price.  National Power and 
PowerGen also sold much of their output under contract, which reduces their short-term 
incentive to raise the spot price.  High or volatile spot prices will increase the price at which 
they can sell contracts in future, however, and so being heavily contracted does not eliminate 
the companies’ incentive to exercise market power in the spot market. 
 National Power and PowerGen also invested heavily in new CCGT plant.  In total, 
18.5 GW of new CCGT capacity and 1.2 GW of nuclear capacity were added between March 
1990 and March 2000.  Since the system had spare capacity in 1990, and peak demand has 
                                                     
2 The Director General of Electricity Supply was responsible for regulating the industry.  His office was 
originally known as Offer (Office of Electricity Regulation) but combined with the gas regulator’s office in 
1999 to form Ofgem (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets), with the same person appointed to regulate both 
gas and electricity.  In 2001, he became the first Chairman of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority, which 
has replaced the individual regulators.  
3 PowerGen bought East Midlands Electricity, while National Power bought the supply business, but not the 
distribution network, belonging to Midlands.  All of the ex-REC supply businesses are now part of vertically 
integrated groups.  
4 Much of the detail of the industry’s regulation is governed through licences.  All companies in the industry are 
required to hold an appropriate licence for each of their activities.  These can normally only be changed with the 
company’s agreement, or if the regulator gains the support of the Competition Commission. 
5 Not all independent commentators agree with this view (Hogan, 2000; Newbery, 1998; Wolfram, 1999).  The 
National Audit Office, however, concluded that NETA had “facilitated” lower wholesale prices (NAO, 2003, 
para 6). 
 3
grown only from 48.3 GW to 51 GW, the incumbents have obviously been able to close a 
large amount of capacity without risking shortages.  Nevertheless, the regulator has been 
concerned that the companies should not close an excessive amount of capacity, and the 
companies agreed in 1992 to allow an independent assessor to examine their closure 
decisions, should the regulator request this.  This agreement was embodied in a new licence 
condition that also required the companies to give the regulator an annual statement of their 
plans for making each unit available to the market, a half-yearly update, and an end-of-year 
reconciliation, noting and explaining any significant changes.  The licence condition does not 
lay down what the availability policies should be, but the regulator has enough information to 
decide whether the companies are following their stated policies, and assess their impact on 
the market.  
 The companies’ price bids are placed in the public domain a few days after they are 
made, and the regulator has often studied them in reports on competition.  In 1992, the 
regulator agreed that stations that were used to meet constraints were justified in bidding at a 
(high) level that nevertheless did not recover more than their costs over the year as a whole, if 
they were only occasionally called on to generate at that level (Offer, 1992).  In the mid-
1990s, the companies agreed to bid in such a way as to produce prices below a given level (in 
normal circumstances).  Apart from this, the regulator did not attempt to place other restraints 
on the companies’ bids until the introduction of the “good behaviour” licence condition.  He 
commented on the level of prices, but tended to place less emphasis on the means used to 
achieve that level.  
 
 
3. Power Markets and Models 
Economists have been interested in the ways electricity companies can raise prices above 
their costs.  Most electricity markets are based on some form of auction.  In real time, the 
system operator must match demand and supply, and the price bids from an auction allow 
this to be done in an economically efficient manner.  In the longer term, bilateral contracts 
are common, but most markets have some forum in which buyers and sellers can sell power 
on a short-term basis.  In the Nordic countries, this forum is NordPool, while national 
regulation markets are responsible for minute-by-minute balancing.  In California, the Power 
Exchange was one of several Scheduling Co-ordinators that match expected generation and 
demand in advance, while the Independent System Operator dealt with short-term 
adjustments and reserve.  In England and Wales, the Pool was responsible for both day-ahead 
trading and real-time adjustment, but the New Electricity Trading Arrangements that replaced 
it separate the two.  In most cases, however, the day-ahead market (or equivalent) provides a 
marker price for the industry, and one set “as if” in a first-price auction. 
 In a perfectly competitive market, all generators would bid their capacity into this 
market whenever they thought that there was a reasonable chance that it might be needed, 
and would do so at a price equal to their marginal cost.  If no generator owns more than one 
unit, setting a higher price runs the risk that the unit would not be called, without affecting 
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the price that the unit would receive, which would be set by another generator almost all of 
the time.  A generator that does not offer its unit into the market cannot earn anything from it.  
Only if there is very little chance that the unit would be required should it be withheld, in 
order to save the costs of making it available needlessly.  While most of the unit’s costs are 
either fixed on a long-term basis (capital costs are sunk, while a basic level of staffing and 
age-related maintenance are needed for as long as the station is open) or directly related to 
output (fuel costs and maintenance based on the station’s operating regime), some staff costs 
would be incurred if the station was made available but not required to generate.   
A generator that owns many units and wishes to increase the market price has two 
main alternatives.  The first is to bid all of its available capacity into the market, but at prices 
above its marginal costs.  The second is to withhold some of its capacity from the market.  If 
the capacity should have been infra-marginal (i.e. it had low costs), this would mean that a 
more expensive unit is now at the margin, raising the price.  In England and Wales, 
withdrawing extra-marginal capacity increases the capacity payment, but withdrawing extra-
marginal capacity might have little impact in other markets, unless other generators interpret 
the move as a signal to adopt higher-priced strategies.  
The first papers on market power in England and Wales looked at bid-based price 
increases. von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993 used an auction model to suggest that generators 
would follow a mixed strategy with expected bids above marginal costs, although their 
approach did not allow for detailed modelling of the generators’ capacities and cost 
structures.  They were able to show generators’ bid curves that were consistent with their 
approach. Green and Newbery (1992) used the supply function approach, which can cope 
with more detailed information on capacities and costs, but yields multiple equilibria.  The 
higher-priced equilibria involve supply functions that diverge from marginal cost at an 
increasing rate as marginal cost itself rises.  Green (1994) compares generators’ bids with 
their marginal costs, and shows that they appear to be consistent with the supply function 
approach, but does not use any formal statistics.  Wolfram (1998) does use a statistical 
approach, and places her work in the auction tradition, but her findings are consistent with 
supply function models.  Her main results are that the larger generator in the British duopoly 
had higher bids, relative to its marginal costs, and that all stations tended to submit higher 
bids when their owner had more lower-cost capacity available.  Raising the price bid by one 
station will raise the price received by all the stations that are infra-marginal when it runs.  
The more of these that belong to the station’s owner, the greater the incentive to bid up its 
price. 
 Most papers on other markets have followed the approach of Cournot competition, in 
which generators decide how much of their capacity to make available to the market in each 
period, and prices are set to bring demand into balance with this supply.  Cournot models 
have been used to analyse markets in Sweden (Andersson and Bergman, 1995), the Nordic 
countries (Amundsen et al, 1999) and California (Borenstein and Bushnell, 1999), amongst 
others.  These papers attempt to predict energy prices, and might be construed as in the 
“price-increase” tradition, but the strategic instrument is in fact the capacity offered to the 
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market.  Since each generator assumes that its rivals will not respond to any reduction in its 
own capacity, the equilibria tend to involve greater reductions in output, and higher prices, 
than supply function models in which generators expect their rivals’ output to increase when 
they try to exercise market power. 
Three papers clearly look at the generators’ decision on whether to offer their 
capacity to the market.  Newbery (1995) showed that the capacity payment system gives 
British generators an additional incentive to keep some of their capacity from the market, and 
quantified the size of this incentive.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that generators have 
sometimes delayed the end of an outage if this would raise the level of capacity payments. 
Crampes and Creti (2001) show how generators would have an incentive to reduce the 
amount of capacity that they offered into the market if this would then turn the market from 
one with excess capacity and low bids into a capacity-constrained market with high prices in 
equilibrium.  Wolak and Patrick (1997) introduced the idea of withholding infra-marginal 
capacity in order to raise prices without raising their bids above marginal cost.  They show 
that the generators declared roughly the same amount of capacity declared available, relative 
to demand, in peak (November – February) and off-peak months (the remainder) between 
April 1991 and March 1995.  Since demand was much lower in off-peak months, this meant 
that a large amount of capacity was not made available to the market at those times.  The 
mean availability in peak months was 51 GW, while the mean availability in off-peak months 
was 43.8 GW.  Furthermore, National Power and PowerGen had lower availability figures, 
for each type of plant that they owned, than comparable plants in North America, when new 
entrants to the market were achieving higher availabilities than comparable American 
stations. 
Wolak and Patrick suggest that the generators would prefer to withhold capacity from 
the market, compared to raising their bid prices, because capacity withholding could be 
disguised as maintenance, while the regulator could easily compare each station’s bid price to 
an estimate of its marginal costs.  In practice, however, the regulator has not often referred to 
explicit comparisons of a station’s bid with its costs.  A study on constrained-on plant (Offer, 
1992) gave revenue and cost figures for a number of stations that had submitted high bids to 
exploit their geographical position, and a report on gas turbine plant also considered station 
costs.  There have been a number of comparisons of differing bids made by the same station 
at different times, with the implication that at least some of them could not have been cost-
reflective.  However, the overall level of prices has rarely been related to the generators’ 
costs – a study on “costs and margins” promised in 1993 never saw the light of day, and the 
regulator has not referred to it since. 
In contrast, however, the major generators were required to provide the regulator with 
an annual forecast of their capacity availability, on a set-by-set basis, a half-way update, and 
a reconciliation at the end of each year.  The licence condition governing these statements 
made no attempt to lay down levels of availability, but they provided the regulator with all 
the evidence that he might need, were he to investigate a generator for anti-competitive 
behaviour.  The regulator has used information on forced outage rates and demand adjusted 
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to normal weather conditions to determine whether a temporary reduction in the plant 
margin, which caused high capacity payments in January 1995, was “abnormal” (Offer, 
1995).  The major generators also had to provide the regulator with advance notice of any 
plans to close capacity, and consider the option of offering it to sale to a third party.  The 
regulator could appoint an independent assessor to decide whether the plans are reasonable, 
and it is unlikely that an assessor would approve closures when capacity payments are 
predicted to be high.6   All in all, the generators may have had less freedom with their 
capacity declarations than with their price bids. 
 
 
4. Capacity withdrawal and capacity payments 
In some circumstances, keeping capacity away from the market is a perfectly acceptable 
competitive response.  A peaking station is unlikely to be required to run overnight, when 
demand is low.  The station may be technically available, in that it is not undergoing 
maintenance, but it would not make commercial sense to staff the station at operational levels 
– the staff would be wasting their time, waiting for a call from the grid operators that is not 
going to arrive.  The station should only be made available in the sense of being staffed and 
ready to generate during daytime hours when it is likely to be needed.  Availability figures in 
the Pool were based on this definition, and some mid-merit and peaking stations regularly 
declared themselves “commercially unavailable” at off-peak times.7  If this is done without 
affecting prices, then it can be counted as a proper competitive response.  This would be the 
case when there the chance that the station would actually be required to run is negligible.8  If 
prices rise in response, however, then there is a possibility of market manipulation.  The 
question is whether the price before the station was withdrawn was high enough to cover the 
costs of making it available over the relevant period.  If the price was above the avoidable 
cost of keeping the station open, the “competitive” option would be to make it available, 
while if the price was below this level, a single station’s owner would lose money by keeping 
the station in the market, and should withdraw it.   
This gives us a test.  If generators had perfect foresight and acted competitively, 
capacity payments should equal the avoidable cost of a peaking station.  Higher capacity 
payments would imply anti-competitive behaviour.  It is normal to compare costs and 
revenues over the course of a year, and generators do recover most of their costs at the time 
                                                     
6   It is not strictly necessary to use predictions, since companies trade annual contracts to hedge capacity 
payments, and so actual market prices can be used to compare a station’s costs with its potential revenues.  
7 Officially, stations in the US would still be considered available in these circumstances (Personal 
Communication: M. Curley of NERC, 29 August 2000), and so comparisons between US and UK availability 
data can be misleading – US stations should only be recorded as unavailable when shut down for, or awaiting, 
maintenance.  In practice, Joskow and Schmalensee (1987) show that units with a low ratio of actual to 
available output tended to have lower availability figures.  They ascribe this to the strain of frequently turning 
the station on and off, leading to increased maintenance, but the pattern is consistent with stations being 
declared unavailable simply because they do not expect to run. 
8   The calculation behind capacity payments actually uses every station’s highest availability over the previous 
eight days, and so declaring a station unavailable overnight and at weekends should have no impact on the 
capacity payment. 
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of the system peak.  That does not imply that capacity payments should be zero at all other 
times, however.  Even in off-peak months, some plant must be made available, but not 
expected to generate, at the daily peak, and will incur an avoidable cost in doing this.  
Capacity payments must be expected to exceed zero, if only slightly, to make it worthwhile to 
declare this reserve capacity available. 
At the annual level, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1996) has reported 
that the fixed costs of an open cycle gas turbine plant were £6/kW per year.  This might be a 
lower bound on the expected capacity payment that a competitive generator would require in 
order to keep its station open.  An independent assessor’s report on plant closures (Offer, 
1998) gave a fixed cost for a unit of £22.50/kW per year, with an extra £5/kW per year for 
station costs.  However, the unit cost (for a 200 MW unit) included £8 million for an 
overhaul, spread over 4 years of operation, or £10/kW/year.  For a station close to the end of 
its life, but capable of continued running without such an overhaul, the avoidable cost would 
be £17.50/kW per year.  In 1992, Offer’s report on constrained-on plant included output and 
cost figures for a number of stations – with appropriate assumptions on fuel prices, thermal 
efficiencies, and variable operations and maintenance costs, the implied fixed costs were 
around £25/kW per year.  That might form an upper bound for the expected capacity payment 
that should trigger plant closures.   
These bounds should be compared with the expected capacity payments at the time 
closure decisions would be made, which are unobservable.9  The actual capacity payments 
will be higher than the expected level if the weather is cold (England and Wales have a 
winter peak) or plant failures are above average, and lower if a warm winter coincides with 
few plant failures.  Over a number of years, however, the average actual capacity payment 
might form a good proxy for the expected level.  Table 1 shows the capacity payment in each 
year from 1990/1 onwards.  Figures are given for a complete financial year, and broken down 
into monthly averages for the winter, the summer, and the “shoulder” months (March, April, 
September and October).  Competitive behaviour would imply that the annual average prices 
were close to the range of £6/kW to £25/kW discussed above, and that these should be 
concentrated in the winter months.  Capacity payments in the summer and the shoulder 
months should be low (but not zero) if the generators are acting competitively. 
The annual capacity payments are volatile, and there are a number of individual years, 
particularly later in the period, when they exceed our range for the competitive level.  Their 
cumulative average over the life of the Pool, however, does remain below the upper bound of 
competitive values.  In most years, capacity payments outside the winter months are also low 
enough to be compatible with a competitive outcome.  In the following paragraphs, we 
comment on some of the payments that appear to have exceeded competitive levels.   
 
                                                     
9 Some contracts for differences were written to hedge capacity payments alone, and would form a guide to 
participants’ expectations, but prices for these are not in the public domain. 
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Table 1:  Capacity payments in England and Wales, 1999-2000 prices  
Monthly capacity payment, £/kW  Annual Capacity 
Payment, £/kW 
Average, 
1990/1 to date, 
£/kW 
Winter 
(Nov-Feb) 
Shoulder Summer 
(May-
Aug) 
1990/1 0.55 0.55 0.10 0.00 0.02 
1991/2 13.73 7.14 1.59 1.24 0.26 
1992/3 1.76 5.35 0.23 0.16 0.01 
1993/4 2.89 4.74 0.51 0.09 0.05 
1994/5 31.49 10.09 6.53 0.45 0.12 
1995/6 42.59 15.50 8.21 0.76 0.64 
1996/7 30.32 17.62 3.45 2.19 1.75 
1997/8 7.59 16.37 1.45 0.20 0.07 
1998/9 8.82 15.53 0.94 0.26 0.96 
1999/00 24.10 16.39 2.18 1.90 1.94 
2000/01 38.08 18.36 1.11 5.94 2.47 
 
The table suggests that capacity withholding to increase capacity payments was not a 
significant feature of the early years of the Pool.  The one, quite well known, exception 
concerns behaviour by PowerGen in the summer and early autumn of 1991.  Each day, the 
company declared that some of its stations would not be available on the following day, 
raising the loss of load probability, and setting capacity payments at a higher level than if the 
stations had been available.  The stations were then re-declared to be available, and collected 
the capacity payment, which had been fixed and could not be re-calculated.  The company 
soon stopped the practice, in response to criticism by the regulator, who imposed the 
availability reporting requirements described above.  Furthermore, the Pool Rules were 
changed to use every station’s highest availability (declared or actual) over an eight-day 
period when calculating the loss of load probability.  This made PowerGen’s original tactics 
effectively impossible – a station would have had to be unavailable for a week before 
delaying its return to service would affect capacity payments.  If a plant has been on outage 
for eight days or more, however, a company could gain from delaying its return, and there is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence that this sometimes happened.  In the first few years of the Pool, 
however, any extended outages of this kind failed to raise capacity payments above 
“competitive” levels. 
In the period since 1994/5, however, capacity payments were much higher, averaging 
more than £20/kW.  The high payments in 1994/5 were the subject of an Offer investigation, 
which found them to be the result of an unlikely combination of plant outages, as discussed 
above.  In 1995/6, payments were concentrated in the winter, when demand was high, and 
raised by exports to France (where output was reduced by strikes).  In other words, they 
could once again be consistent with competitive availability choices.   
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The following year, however, capacity payments were at similar levels (on average) 
throughout the year.  That might suggest that generators were making enough plant available 
at the winter peak, but withdrawing too much of it at other times of the year, raising “off 
peak” capacity payments.  The data for 1999/00 would be consistent with this, but Ofgem 
(1999) provides an alternative explanation.  Capacity payments depended not only on the 
amount of plant on the system, relative to demand, but also on its reliability.  That was 
measured in a way which tended to make new capacity appear less reliable, and so capacity 
payments would be higher, the greater the proportion of new plant on the system.  The plant 
margin was actually slightly higher in July 1999 than in July 1998, but capacity payments 
were five times as high.  Part of this was due to an increase in the proportion of new plant: 
half of the increase was due to the way in which a single (lengthy) outage at a relatively new 
nuclear station affected its calculated reliability (Ofgem, 1999, pp 25-6).  This begs the 
question of why the payments were calculated in this way, but also suggests that the high 
payments in 1999/2000 were “innocent” rather than the result of strategic capacity 
withdrawal.  
In the summer of 2000, however, Ofgem took action when Edison Mission Energy 
withdrew 480 MW of capacity from the market.  Edison was one of the companies that had 
accepted Ofgem’s short-lived market abuse licence condition, and the regulator started an 
investigation into the company’s decision.  Ofgem (2000) reported that “on the basis of 
analysing the avoidable costs of the capacity withdrawn by the company … against spot and 
forward prices it appears that Edison may be in breach of the market abuse condition.”  
Edison then agreed to return the plant to service, and Ofgem took no further action.  This is 
the first time that the regulator has taken action against a generator for withdrawing capacity 
since PowerGen’s blatant manipulation of 1991. The highest prices of 2000/1 came two 
months later, in September 2000, and Ofgem’s investigation once again concluded that the 
shortcomings of the capacity payment’s calculation, rather than deliberate action on the part 
of generators, was to blame.   
While the capacity payments mechanism had serious flaws in its calculations, and 
generators did engage in “tactical” withdrawals of capacity, it is probably reasonable to 
conclude that for most of the 1990s, generators did not “strategically” withhold enough 
capacity from the market to force expected capacity payments above competitive levels. 
While the level and pattern of capacity payments is generally consistent with 
“competitive” behaviour, the way in which the dominant generators withdrew capacity from 
the market does deserve a comment.  In general, it is likely to be more expensive to retain 
two stations, closing part of the capacity at each, than to close a single station.10  
Furthermore, if a station is to be closed, making the closure permanent at once will allow the 
company to dispose of the site.  National Power and PowerGen, however, have frequently 
closed stations in stages, and mothballed plant before announcing its permanent closure.  
Mothballing plant might have been part of an entry-deterring strategy, with the implied threat 
                                                     
10 Keeping part of a station open can be justified if it is required to provide system support, perhaps by easing a 
transmission constraint, and can earn enough from doing so to offset the additional costs involved. 
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that the market could be flooded with spare capacity, should there be excessive entry.  In 
practice, however, such threats were never carried out, and appear to have been very 
unsuccessful in deterring entry.  Closing a station in stages will sometimes be a tactical 
response to the regulator’s requirement that the generators should consider selling stations 
that they plan to close.  It is practically impossible to buy part of a station, and so partial 
closure allows the generators to avoid selling plant that they believe is surplus to 
requirements.  If the closure was justified on “competitive” grounds, then a stand-alone 
operator should not be able to make a profit from the station, but the generators may have 
feared that a rival would attempt to force the incumbents to withdraw other plants, 
accelerating their loss of market share.  If the closure was not justified on competitive 
grounds, but was part of an anti-competitive capacity withdrawal, then the plants would be 
more attractive to rival generators, who could make a profit without further closures from the 
incumbents.  The evidence above, however, and the regulator’s investigations into proposed 
closures, suggest that the level of closures was generally justified on competitive grounds, 
even if their manner was in some respects dubious. 
 
 
5. Capacity withdrawal to raise energy prices 
The previous section has considered withdrawing high-cost capacity in order to boost 
capacity payments.  A second kind of manipulation has been suggested by Wolak and Patrick 
(1997).  An incumbent might withhold low-cost capacity, ensuring that higher-cost stations 
would set the system marginal price, thus raising it, without requiring any station to bid 
significantly above its costs.  This strategy might be undertaken at times of low demand, and 
the stations made available when demand was higher, so that the system marginal price could 
be increased without increasing capacity payments.  Wolak and Patrick suggest that it would 
be hard for a regulator to detect this kind of capacity withholding, since it could be disguised 
as maintenance.  
 Withholding a station in this way, however, will reduce its load factor.  The stations 
that run instead will have higher load factors.  This section of the paper uses information on 
load factors before and after restructuring to construct a test for this kind of capacity 
withholding.  The CEGB regularly published the load factors of its stations, while the MMC 
published information on the load factors of National Power and PowerGen’s coal-fired 
stations in its 1996 reports into their merger proposals.  NGC provided load-duration curves, 
showing the number of hours in each year for which demand above a given level.   
If all stations were available throughout the year, and there were no transmission 
constraints or other operating restrictions, then it would be possible to match the generators’ 
output exactly to the shape of the load-duration curve.  The most efficient stations would 
have a load factor of 100%, while less efficient stations would run for as long as there was 
demand for their output.  In practice, however, it is extremely unlikely that a station would be 
available for the whole year, and so its load factor will be less than 100%.  The “missing” 
output must be made up by another station, and will be outside the load-duration curve.  
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Operating restrictions will further reduce the output of the more efficient stations, and 
increase the output of those with higher costs.  This will give us the pattern shown in figure 1.  
The line is the load-duration curve, showing the demand for each hour in the year, 
ranked in decreasing order of demand.  The highest demand is placed at hour 0, and the 
lowest at hour 8760 (8784 in a leap year, and 8640 in 2000/1, when the Pool was abolished 
on March 26).  The rectangles show each station’s output, ranked in merit order – the stations 
with the lowest operating costs, which ought to run the most, are at the bottom.  The dark 
grey portions show the output that was “within” the load-duration curve, and would have 
been produced if generation had perfectly matched demand.  The light grey portions are the 
output that was only required because some other stations were generating less than the 
system could have accepted from them – the dark grey areas do not fill the area under the 
load-duration curve.  The total area of the light grey portions should be the same as the area 
of the blank spaces under the load-duration curve. 
The CEGB’s last published output data were for 1985/6, 1986/7 and 1987/8.  Output 
patterns in 1984/5 were significantly disrupted by the miners’ strike of that year, and earlier 
years might be increasingly unrepresentative of the system as it was restructured.  We assume 
that the CEGB aimed to run its stations in the “true” merit order, and derive this from the 
mean load factor of each station across the three years – the coal-fired stations with the 
highest load factors during this period are assumed to be highest in the merit order.  
 Throughout the 1990s, the price of coal in the UK was sufficiently high, relative to 
the price of gas, that CCGT stations were always above coal-fired stations in the merit order, 
given their greater thermal efficiency.  To obtain the merit order for the 1990s, we simply 
inserted the CCGT stations above the best coal-fired stations, with the newest stations at the 
top.  This assumption would break down for 2000/1, however.  In the second half of that 
year, the price of gas delivered to power stations was 50% higher, relative to the delivered 
price of coal, than over the previous eighteen months.  This was the only time in the Pool’s 
history that a CCGT would have had significantly higher fuel costs than a coal-fired station.  
Table 2 shows how this affected the type of plant which was setting SMP – in 1999/2000, 
CCGTs were only on the margin for one percent of the time.  In the first half of the following 
year, this had risen to 4.8 percent of the time, and 13.5 percent of the time in the second half 
of the year.  Given the change in fuel prices, this was clearly due to a change in the cost-
based merit order, and not to a change in generators’ strategies.  Since the merit order 
changed in the middle of the year, it is not possible to compare 2000/1 with the years of a 
stable merit order.  Results for each year of the Pool are reported, but the comparisons are 
based on the ten years from 1990/1 onwards. 
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Table 2: Plants setting System Marginal Price, by fuel type (number of half-hours) 
 
 1999/2000 April – Sept 2000 
Oct 2000 – Mar 
2001 
Coal 14,260 81.2% 6,861 78.1% 5,416 63.7% 
Interconnector 2,336 13.3% 843 9.6% 1,592 18.7% 
PSB 757 4.3% 652 7.4% 339 4.0% 
CCGT 170 1.0% 422 4.8% 1,147 13.5% 
OCGT 43 0.2% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
CCGT/CHP 2 0.0% 5 0.1% 0 0.0% 
No SMP was set 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 
       
Totals 17,568 100% 8,784 100.0% 8,496 100.0% 
 
Returning to figure 1, we could simply take the ratio of the blank area under the load-
duration curve to total generation as an indicator of the “mis-match” between generation and 
demand, and compare this across years.  This would ignore the role of forced outages, 
however.  The CEGB (along with most other system planners) assumed that a proportion of 
plant would be unavailable at any time, for technical reasons.  This means that we should 
never expect to fill the area under the load-duration curve with generation.  We can get a 
more realistic “ideal” pattern if we shrink the load-duration curve along the horizontal axis, 
while stretching it along the vertical axis to preserve the total area.  Using a 10% forced 
outage rate (the CEGB norm) the maximum length of running expected would shrink to 90% 
of the year (7884 hours), while a peak demand of 45 GW would be raised to 50 GW.  Figure 
2 shows the dotted original load-duration curve, and the revised curve.  A greater proportion 
of the generator’s output is under this revised curve, reflecting the fact that the industry needs 
enough capacity to meet the peak demand plus a margin for unavailable stations.  
We will make a second adjustment, to take account of new stations, and the nuclear 
stations.  Once they have been commissioned, most new stations (and all built during our 
period) would be at the top of the merit order, running nearly continuously.  While they are 
commissioning, however, new stations will only produce intermittently, to a timetable 
dictated by their testing requirements, rather than by market conditions.  The amount of plant 
being commissioned varied over our period, and it would be unreasonable to count output 
that was “lost” during commissioning as evidence of capacity withholding.  Similarly, while 
nuclear stations attempted to run at high load factors, they all too often failed to achieve 
these, for reasons that had nothing to do with National Power and PowerGen (which did not 
own any nuclear stations).  The striped area in figure 2 represents the output lost due to plant 
commissioning or poor nuclear performance, compared to a target load factor of 85%.  Note 
that this still allows for some “under-performance” compared to the vertical section of the 
adjusted load-duration curve, which is at a load factor of 90%. 
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Table 3 shows how these calculations work in practice, for four stations in 1990/91.  
Hinkley Point B was a nuclear station which achieved a load factor of 76.5%, and output of 
7,510 GWh.  At the top of the merit order, we assume that a “perfect” performance would 
have been a load factor of 90%, and an output of 8,830 GWh.  The difference between 8,830 
GWh and 7,510 GWh is a measure of the lost output due to its failure to match the load-
duration curve – some 1,320 GWh.  Since Hinkley Point B was a nuclear station, however, 
we discount shortfalls below a load factor of 85%, and so only 490 GWh (8,830 – 8,340) are 
treated as truly lost. 
 
       Table 3 – illustrative calculations for selected stations, 1990/91 
Station 
Hinkley  
Point B Drax Cottam Drakelow C 
Capacity 1120 3750 1920 448 
Actual Load Factor 76.5 79.1 76.1 25.6 
LDC load factor 90 90 84.3 15.1 
Output at this LF 8,830 29,565 14,179 593 
Output at 85% LF 8,340    
Actual Output 7,510 25,994 12,805 1,006 
Lost Output 1,320 3,571 1,374 0 
Truly Lost Output 490 3,571 1,374 0 
 
The large coal-fired station at Drax was also high enough up the merit order to have a 
potential load factor of 90%.  Its actual load factor was 79.1%, and the shortfall was 3,571 
GWh (29,565 – 25,994), all of which was counted as “truly lost”.  Another large coal-fired 
station, Cottam was slightly lower down the merit order, and had a potential load factor, had 
all stations above it been operating at their maximum load factors, of 84.3%.  Instead, its load 
factor was 76.1%, and so it accounted for 1,374 GWh of lost (and “truly lost”) output.  
Finally, Drakelow C was a low merit station with small, less efficient, units.  Its potential 
load factor would only have been 15.1%, had all the stations above it been operating at their 
maximum load factors, but their shortfalls actually allowed it a load factor of 25.6%.  With an 
actual output greater than the amount under the load-duration curve, it was not responsible 
for any lost output. 
In general, the adjustment for new plant is made for the first financial year in which a 
new station generated.  Some stations started their commissioning late in the year, however, 
and did not have time to produce much output before the year end.  It would be inappropriate 
to discount a large amount of lost output on account of a plant that was only just starting the 
commissioning process, however.  Therefore, new stations with load factors of less than 25% 
were moved down the merit order to be treated as peaking plant, where they would not affect 
the amount of lost output.  The adjustment for output lost in commissioning was made in the 
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following year.  Taking the two years together, this will reduce the amount of lost output that 
is discounted due to the plant’s commissioning.   
Many new plants had several units, but they were generally commissioned 
simultaneously, or nearly so, and therefore treated together.  The main exception is the Drax 
coal-fired station, which commissioned its last two units (out of six) in 1985 and 1986.  
Drax’s reported output is not broken down by unit, and any output produced by the new units 
before they were formally commissioned was not assigned to the station, but reported as a 
total for all such units, (which included several nuclear stations at this time).  Since 2.5 GW 
(3.1 GW) of capacity had already been commissioned before 1985/6 (1986/7), it would be 
inappropriate to apply the adjustment for new plant to the entire station, when only one 625 
MW unit was being commissioned in each year.  We therefore assumed that the 
commissioning unit achieved a load factor of only 25%, and deduct 3.3 TWh (625 MW × 
60% × 8,760 hours) of output from the calculated amount of lost output in 1985/6 and 
1986/7.  This almost certainly over-estimates the amount of output to be discounted on behalf 
of these units, improving the performance of the CEGB.  Since the post-privatisation industry 
turns out to be better than the CEGB at fitting its output to the load-duration curve, any 
assumption that improves the CEGB’s performance will narrow the gap between the two.  
This adjustment also moves Drax to the top of the merit order for coal-fired stations, based on 
the implied performance of its “established” units.11  Two post-privatisation stations, South 
Humber Bank and Seabank, were also commissioned in two stages, and each part is treated as 
a separate station in this analysis.  
This analysis assumes that the shape of the load-duration curve is the only constraint 
on generators.  In practice, some stations have to reduce their output because of constraints 
on the transmission system.  Output from low-cost stations has to be replaced by output from 
higher-cost stations that are closer to the load centres, in order to avoid overloading the 
transmission lines from the more distant stations.  Transmission constraints rose significantly 
in the early 1990s, in part because of the amount of new plant being connected to the 
transmission system and old plant being disconnected.  If this meant that high-merit stations 
had to generate less, it might be expected to worsen the fit between the load-duration curve 
and actual generation.  This would provide an “innocent” explanation for any deterioration in 
performance in the early 1990s.  In practice, we will see that this fit improved after 
privatisation, despite any impact of constraints. 
Our test, therefore, is to measure the blank area under the adjusted load duration 
curve, as a proportion of total output.  The shaded area above the load-duration curve can be 
denoted “excess output”, the striped area under the load-duration curve is the part of this that 
is due to low output levels from nuclear plant or new entrants, and the blank area under the 
load-duration curve is “truly excess output”.  If generators are withholding capacity that 
                                                     
11 Drax was also the first station to have Flue Gas Desulphurisation equipment fitted, and while this slightly 
reduced its thermal efficiency, the Environment Agency required National Power to run Drax in preference to 
other stations without FGD, reinforcing its position at the top of the coal-fired merit order.  
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should have been in merit, in order to raise the system marginal price, the amount of truly 
excess output should rise after restructuring.  Table 4 gives the figures. 
 
Table 4: Output and the load-duration curve  
 
Year Total Output 
(TWh) 
Within load-
duration 
curve 
Lost new and 
nuclear 
output 
Truly excess 
output 
(TWh) 
Truly excess 
   % 
1985/6 231,983  200,269  12,801  18,913  0.082 
1986/7 237,785  192,715  21,359  23,711  0.100 
1987/8 243,912  206,643  13,940  23,330  0.096 
      
1990/1 261,537  224,515  16,730  20,291  0.078 
1991/2 263,259  232,226  13,392  17,641  0.067 
1992/3 262,655  229,947  14,538  18,171  0.069 
1993/4 266,523  229,584  14,049  22,890  0.086 
1994/5 268,953  227,025  21,192  20,736  0.077 
1995/6 283,779  245,138  23,756  14,885  0.052 
1996/7 286,851  249,705  12,214  24,931  0.087 
1997/8 288,193  252,083  10,870  25,239  0.088 
1998/9 293,368  254,962  10,773  27,633  0.094 
1999/00 296,741  252,269  23,723  20,749  0.070 
2000/1 306,083  245,925  23,596  36,562  0.119 
 
On this definition, 9.2% of output was “truly excess” in the three years of CEGB operation.  
In almost every year after the restructuring, the proportion of truly excess output was lower.  
The one glaring exception is 2000/1, the last year of the Pool, and the way in which the 
changing fuel prices during the year make the comparison inappropriate is discussed above.   
 We can test the hypothesis that the mean percentage of truly excess output was the 
same in the first three years and the next ten years of data, using Excel’s built-in t-test.  If we 
assume that the two samples have the same variance, the p-value of a two-tailed test for equal 
means is 0.075, while if we assume unequal variances, it is 0.079.12  In either case, we reject 
the hypothesis of equality at the ten percent level.  After privatisation, the generators were 
significantly better at fitting their output to the load-duration curve.  If they had been 
withholding output in order to raise prices, this would have worsened their fit to the load-
duration curve. 
                                                     
12 The variances are 9.11E-05 and 1.55 E-04, which are hardly equal, but an F-test does not reject the 
hypothesis of equality at the 10% level. 
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 Does this result depend upon the values chosen for forced outages and the target load 
factor for new and nuclear plant?  Table 5 shows how the p-value for the hypothesis of equal 
means varies with these parameters.  The table always reports the greater of the two values 
for equal and unequal variances.  
 
Table 5: p-values for testing the hypothesis that the proportion of truly excess output did not 
change between 1985/6-7/8 and 1990/1-99/00 
 
Availability after forced outages Target load factor for 
new and nuclear plant 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 
1.00 0.015     
0.95 0.023 0.016    
0.90 0.037 0.028 0.044   
0.85 0.056 0.046 0.079 0.174  
0.80 0.067 0.055 0.094 0.153 0.632 
0.75 0.059 0.048 0.074 0.097 0.334 
0.70 0.049 0.041 0.058 0.074 0.147 
0.65 0.040 0.034 0.046 0.058 0.089 
 
If the rate of forced outages is 0.1 or lower, then we continue to get a significant difference in 
the proportion of truly excess output, at the ten percent level.  If the rate of forced outages is 
greater than this, and the target load factor for new and nuclear plant is close to that expected 
for established conventional plant, the difference is not significant at this level.  None of the 
tested parameter values implied that the CEGB had a better performance than the privatised 
industry, however.  Furthermore, the qualitative results do not depend upon the treatment of 
new plant.  If we simply look at the proportion of output under the load duration curve, with 
no adjustment for nuclear outages or new plant (apart from continuing to ignore those with 
load factors under 25% in their first year), it rises from 0.840 under the CEGB to 0.864 in the 
first ten years of the Pool.  The improvement is significant at the five percent level if we 
assume equal variances, but not significant (p = 0.252) if we assume that the variances are 
unequal.13 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have studied two ways in which generators could play “Cournot” strategies, raising 
prices by withholding capacity from the market.  From the evidence available, neither 
strategy seems to have been significant in England and Wales.  After an initial abuse of the 
capacity payment, the regulator has required the major generators to provide regular 
information on their capacity and its availability.  It appears that the companies have 
                                                     
13 The variances are 7.33 E-04 and 1.40 E-04  respectively.  An F-test for their equality is not rejected at the 5% 
level, but is rejected at the 10% level. 
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generally made capacity available in a competitive manner, declaring plant whenever it is 
technically available and can expect to earn more than its avoidable costs.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that an outage will sometimes be prolonged unnecessarily with the 
intention of keeping capacity payments high, and there were times near the end of the Pool’s 
life when the regulator found that individual companies had acted in an anti-competitive 
manner.  For much of the period, however, the overall level of payments implies that such 
practices were not used to raise prices by a significant amount.  The industry’s overall 
performance at fitting its output to the load-duration curve improved significantly after 
privatisation, when systematic capacity withholding would have worsened it.  
 Cournot models of the electricity industry do have attractive features.  They can 
support detailed cost modelling, and do not usually suffer from the multiple equilibria 
common with other modelling approaches.  Against this, however, they do not give a good 
representation of the way in which prices are set in electricity markets, and their price 
predictions have generally been too high.14 This paper suggests that models in which firms 
set prices, rather than quantities, are likely to give better results. 
 
 
 
                                                     
14 A rare exception is Bushnell (2003), which shows that a Cournot model, updating the assumptions of 
Borenstein and Bushnell (1999), gives a good fit to the prices experienced in California in the summer of 2000.  
While this is before the final crisis, the market was hardly performing well at this stage. 
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Figure 1: The Raw Load-Duration Curve
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Figure 2: The Adjusted Load-Duration Curve
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